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Abstract 
Several authors proposed that all elements of Beck’s cognitive triad (1976) mediate the 
associations between inference style as described in the hopelessness model (Abramson, Alloy, 
& Metalsky, 1989) and depressive symptoms.  Results of a 3-wave longitudinal study indicate 
only a partial mediation model with all elements of the cognitive triad being associated with all 
inference styles, with depressive symptoms fitting the data best.  Controlling for direct and 
indirect effects, no individual element of the cognitive triad mediates the association between 
inference styles and depressive symptoms.  The partial mediation model is not stable across sex 
or clinical vs subclinical samples.  In general, the data supports the integration of all three 
elements of the cognitive triad into the hopelessness model. 
 
Keywords: depression; cognitive theory; hopelessness model; cognitive triad. 
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Over the past several decades, two major cognitive theories which explain the 
development and maintenance of depression have been developed and empirically tested, and 
have gained widespread popularity:  The hopelessness model (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 
1989) and Beck’s cognitive theory (Beck, 1976).  These models gained importance for different 
reasons:  First, they provide a theoretical basis for mechanisms underlying the development and 
maintenance of depression.  Second, both cognitive models are supported by empirical research 
(see for a review Abramson, Alloy, Hankin, Haeffel, MacCoon, & Gibb, 2002).  Finally, some of 
the most effective interventions for depression have been developed based on these models 
(Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1976). 
The hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) features inference style as the distal and 
hopelessness as the proximal causes of depression.  In this model, hopelessness is defined as 
expecting a negative outcome for future events.  Inference style is described as the tendency to 
make negative inferences about (1) the stability and (2) globality of causes, (3) consequences, 
and (4) characteristics of the self (self worth, personal abilities, personality, desirability, ect.) 
following a negative event.  When an individual repeatedly infers a negative event in this way he 
or she develops the expectation of hopelessness, which is interpreted as being a proximal cause 
for the symptoms of depression.  In other words, hopelessness mediates the effects of the 
tendency to make negative inferences on depression. In addition, (5) attributing a negative event 
as being caused internally is thought to lead to low self-esteem.  The internal attribution is 
unique from the previously mentioned inferences in two regards. First, having internal attribution 
for negative events is not a cause of depression but of low self-esteem alone.  Second, its effect 
on self-esteem is not mediated by hopelessness. 
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 In Beck’s cognitive model (1976), schemata, cognitive errors, cognitive triad, and 
automatic thoughts are central to the development and maintenance of depression.  Schemata are 
relatively enduring, organizing structures that guide situational information processing.  
Depressogenic schemata are negative in content and consist of immature, absolute, and rigid 
attitudes about the self and its relation to the world.  When activated by stress, depressogenic 
schemata lead to cognitive errors, the next step in the causal pathway to depression.  Cognitive 
errors cause our perception and thinking to be unrealistic, extreme, and distorted in a negative 
way.  As a result, a depressed individual tends to (a) make long-range projections, anticipating 
that current difficulties or suffering will continue indefinitely (negative view of the future); (b) 
attribute negative events to personal psychological, moral, or physical defect (negative view of 
the self); and (c) see the world as making exorbitant demands and/or presenting insuperable 
obstacles to reaching life goals (negative view of the world).  Collectively these three cognitive 
views are known as the cognitive triad (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).  Following Beck 
(1976), the cognitive triad finds its expression in negative automatic thoughts.  Automatic 
thoughts are understood as temporary, non-emotional mental events, which are subjectively 
plausible in certain situations (Beck, 1976).  These automatic thoughts can be interpreted as the 
most proximal cause for the emotional, somatic, and motivational symptoms of depression.  In 
an update to his traditional theory, Beck (1996) introduced the concept of modes.  Modes 
represent a network of cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral components that are 
designed to deal with specific demands or problems. Based on this update, all variables in Beck’s 
cognitive theory are directly associated with each other, suggesting only partial mediation of 
depressive symptoms.  Empirical studies have confirmed this prediction (Kwon & Oei, 1992; 
Pössel, 2010a). 
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Both cognitive models show similarities.  The most obvious similarity between these 
models is their classification as cognitive vulnerability-stress models, in the sense that the 
interactions between cognitive vulnerabilities and activating negative events are used to explain 
why some individuals develop depression while others do not show this psychopathology.  
Beyond this somewhat crude classification, there are further obvious theoretical similarities 
between the cognitive constructs of these theories.  While inference style and schemata are 
distinguishable constructs (Hankin, Lakdawalla, Latchis Carter, Abela, & Adams, 2007; Pössel 
& Knopf, 2010) and consistently demonstrate different associations with depressive symptoms 
(Haeffel et al., 2003), Abramson et al.’s concept of hopelessness (1989) and Beck’s negative 
view of the future as elements of the cognitive triad (1976) are essentially the same (Spangler, 
Simons, Monroe, & Thase, 1997).  This notion is shared by the authors of the hopelessness 
model.  Abramson, Alloy, and Metalsky (1988) hypothesize that the proximal causes (i.e., 
hopelessness and negative cognitive triad) and the symptom profiles described by the two 
models largely overlap.  Specifically, the hypothesis that hopelessness overlaps with the negative 
cognitive triad is partially supported by a longitudinal study with college students (Metalsky & 
Joiner, 1992).  In that study, hopelessness only partially mediates the association of inference 
styles about causes (combined stability and globality), consequences, and characteristics of the 
self with symptoms of hoplessness depression. Therefore, the authors suggest that it is not 
hopelessness, but rather all three elements of Beck’s cognitive triad that mediate these 
associations. 
Specific hypotheses concerning the cognitive triad as mediator between specific parts of 
the inference style and depressive symptoms can be dereived from theoretical articles written by 
the authors of the hopelessness model.  For example, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) 
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propose not only that individuals who make stable or global inferences will expect their own 
future to “look black” (p. 59), but they also hypothesize that stable attributions are likely to be 
related to a negative view of the self.  Abramson et al. (1989) further point out the association 
between inferences about the characteristics of the self and a negative view of the self (e.g., 
“patient tends to attribute his unpleasant experiences to a psychological, moral, or physical 
defect in himself“, p. 11, Beck et al., 1979) as proposed by Beck are logically connected.  No 
further associations between parts of the inference style and the cognitive triad are proposed by 
the authors of the hopelessness model or by Beck.  Nevertheless, as none of the refered articles 
had the aim to discuss all possible associations between parts of the inference style and the 
cognitive triad, it can not be excluded that additional associations exist.  In addition, neither the 
negative view of the self nor the negative view of the world from Beck’s cognitive model (1976) 
are tested as possible mediators between the parts of the inference style and symptoms of 
depression.  Thus, the goal of this three-wave longitudinal study is to help close this gap within 
the empirical literature by comparing the original hopelessness model (with only the negative 
view of the future as mediator), with a model including all proposed paths, and a more 
explorative model in that all three elements of the cognitive triad are mediators between all 
inference styles and depressive symptoms.  
Similarly, the empirical literature exploring the associations between cognitive variables 
and depressive symptoms as they relate to differences in sex or between clinically depressed 
individuals and nonclinically depressed individuals is very limited.  Research has indicated that 
women are about twice as likely to develop depression as men (Angst, Gamma, Gastpar, Lépine, 
Mendlewicz, & Tylee, 2002).  However, while differences in cognitive variables between the 
sexes has been well studied (see for a review Nolen-Hoeksema, 2006), there are only a few 
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studies about possible differences in the associations between cognitive variables as proposed by 
Beck’s cognitive theory Beck (1976; 1996) or the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) 
and depressive symptoms (Goldstein, 2006; Stone, Gibb, & Coles, 2010).  While neither of the 
two cognitive theories studied here predict sex differences in the associations between cognitive 
variables and depressive symptoms, both studies found that the association between stable and 
global attribution of negative events and depressive symptoms was significant in women but not 
in men.  In addition, the interaction between inferences and life events was not significantly 
associated with depressive symptoms in women in either study, or in men in Goldstein’s (2006) 
study.  However, we are not aware of any research about sex differences in the associations 
between inference style and hopelessness (negative view of the future).  Thus, the possibility of 
the existence of sex differences in the associations between inference style, cognitive triad, and 
depressive symptoms can not be excluded. 
Regarding possible differences in the associations of cognitive variables and depressive 
symptoms between clinically depressed individuals and nonclinically depressed individuals, 
neither of the two cognitive theories predicts differences in the associations of cognitive 
variables with depressive symptoms (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1976, 1996).  Furthermore, in 
their theoretical article which addresses the functions of cognitive constructs in Beck’s cognitive 
model (1976) in the development, maintenance, and recovery phase of a depressive episode, 
Kwon and Oei (1994) have proposed that the different variables have different functions.  
However, the sequential order of the cognitive variables in relation to each phase of depression 
are equivalent to Kwon and Oei’s proposition.  Nevertheless, we are unaware of any study 
researching this issue and possible differences in the associations between inference style, 
cognitive triad and depressive symptoms can not be excluded. 
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Following Abramson et al. (1978, 1989) and Beck et al. (1979), it is expected that the 
effect of each part of the inference style is partially mediated by a negative view of the future, 
and that the effect of negative inferences about stability and about the characteristics of the self is 
partially mediated by the negative view of the self but not by the negative view of the world.  
Effects of negative inferences about globality and about the consequences of a negative event 
should not be mediated by the negative view of the self or of the world.  Finally, it is predicted 
that all parts of the inference style continue to show direct effects on depressive symptoms at a 
later assessment wave.  Consistent with the cognitive theories,  sex differences or differences 
between clinically and nonclinically depressed individuals are not expected with regard to 
possible differences in the associations between inference style, cognitive triad, and depressive 
symptoms. 
Methods 
Participants 
The sample was derived from 398 psychology students of a university in the southwest of 
Germany (319 women).  Their ages ranged from 18 to 52 years with a mean of 23.27 years and a 
standard deviation of 6.57 years.  Of the participating students 90 (22.6%) reported depressive 
symptoms above the cut-off score for clinical significant symptoms in a self-report measure 
(Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993).  From the first to the second wave 61 students (47 women) dropped 
out.  From the first to the third wave 87 students (66 women) droped out.  There were no 
differences between the dropouts and remaining students in sex, ²(1) = 1.13, p = .287 or 
depressive symptoms, t(387) = -0.69, p = .494. However, dropouts were significantly older, 
t(396) = -2.02, p = .044, than the remaining students. 
Measures 
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Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale (CES – D). The CES-D 
(Radloff, 1977; German version: Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993) consists of 20 items and is 
developed as a quickly administered, economic screening instrument able to measure depressive 
symptoms based on self-report.  Both the original version and the German version were 
developed based on samples of the general population and psychiatric patients (Radloff, 1977; 
Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993).  Frequency of symptoms is rated on a four-point scale with higher 
numbers indicating higher frequency of occurrence.  Following the German norming sample, a 
score of ≥ 23 represented clinical significant depressive symptoms (Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993).   
Different studies compared the CES-D with the BDI/BDI-II in general, finding neither 
instrument to be superior. Fountoulakis et al. (2007), for example, found neither the CES-D nor 
the BDI (Beck et al., 1979) being superior regarding reliability, validity, and correlations to 
anxiety in depressed and normal samples.  Similar the results in a study comparing the CES-D 
and BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) regarding levels of specificity and positive predictive 
value for current, past-year, and lifetime depressive disorder in a college sample (Shean & 
Baldwin, 2008).  Finally, Santor, Zuroff, Ramsay, Cervantes, and Palacios (1995) found the 
CES-D being more discriminating than the BDI in both college students and depressed 
outpatients. Based on these results and the higher acceptability of the CES-D in nonclinical 
samples (Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993) guided our decision to use the CES-D. 
All inferential statistical analyses were calculated without the CES-D items which 
overlap with the cognitive triad (Item 4, 8, 9, 15).  This shortened CES-D still represents the 
factors depressed affect, positive affect, somatic/retarded activity, and interpersonal of the CES-
D (Radloff, 1977). 
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Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ). The CSQ (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 2000) 
measures inferences about causal attributions, consequences, and the self in relation to negative 
events.  The CSQ consists of 24 hypothetical event scenarios which includes six interpersonal 
and six achievement scenarios for both the negative and positive events .  The respondent is 
presented with the hypothetical event and is asked to write down one cause for the event.  
Respondents then rate the degree to which the cause of the hypothetical event was (a) internal, 
(b) stable, and (c) global (negative inferences for causal attributions).  Next, they rate the 
likelihood that further negative consequences will result from the event (negative inferences of 
consequences).  Finally, they  rate the degree to which the occurrence of the event means that the 
self is flawed (negative inferences of the self).  Each rating uses a 7-point Likert scale with 
higher scores representing a more depressive inference style.   
A review of the original CSQ provides support for the reliability and construct validity of 
the CSQ (Haeffel et al., 2008).  Internal consistencies of (a) a combined attribution style 
(globality and stability), (b) the negative inference about consequences and (c) the negative 
inference about the self scales reported in this review range from .83 to .91.  These internal 
consistencies are numerical similar to the ones found in our sample (Table 1).  Regarding 
construct validity, multiple studies found that the CSQ predicts depressive symptoms, an 
association mediated by hopelessness (Haeffel et al., 2008).  A series of confirmatory factor 
analyses with our sample revealed a 4-factor model which includes only positive items fits the 
data better than any other tested model1.  Thus, consistent with these confirmatory factor 
analyses, Abramson et al. (1989), and Metalsky and Joiner (1992), only the negative event 
scenarios were used in this study.  Futhermore, the internal dimension of causal attributions were 
not included in the analysis. 
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Cognitive Triad Instrument (CTI). The CTI (Beckham, Leber, Watkins, Boyer, & 
Cook, 1986; German version: Pössel, 2010b) consists of 36, 7-point Likert items which measure 
positive (4 items) and negative views of the self (6 items), positive and negative views of the 
world (5 items each), and positive and negative views of the future (5 items each).  The 
remaining six items are filler items that are not scored.  The internal consistencies of our study 
(Table 1) are comparable to the ones of the German evaluation study (Pössel, 2010b). In 
addition, both the original and the German CTI demonstrated significant concurrent and 
predictive validity, respectively, in correlations with different measures of depressive symptoms 
(Beckham et al., 1986; Pössel, 2010b).   
Procedures 
Participants completed questionnaire batteries in groups of 8 to 15 at the beginning (wave 
1), middle (wave 2), and end (wave 3) of the fall semester (each being 4 weeks apart).  The order 
of the questionnaires was counterbalanced across the sample following the latin square design.  
Informed consent was obtained and each participant received credit for participation. 
Data Analysis 
In order to test the hypothesized mediation model, we used a three step approach.  First, 
(a) the original hopelessness model with only negative view of the future mediating the 
associations between inference styles and depressive symptoms, (b) the proposed model, and (c) 
a model with all three elements of the cognitive triad mediating the associations between all 
inference styles and depressive symptoms, all with and without partial mediation were calculated 
and compared using the total sample.  In order to test which model fits the data best, Cole and 
Maxwell’s (2003) approach for multi-wave studies using structure equation models was used.   
                                                                                                                                                             
1 The results of these analyses can be requested by the first author. 
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This step of analyses was conducted with the maximum likelihood method using AMOS 
18.0 to calculate structural equation models (Arbuckle, 1999).  Goodness of fit of the models was 
tested with ², ²/df, root mean squared of the residuals (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980), 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 
1974).  Nested models were compared by subtracting the ² values as well as the dfs of the 
models from each other (² difference tests).  When Δ² is significant for Δdf, the models are 
seen as significantly different from each other. 
Second, although this study was not designed for subsample analyses, we felt it would be 
informative for future research to test the stablility of the final model across different groups 
(women vs. men, nonclinical vs. clinical) was tested.  To do this, multigroup analysis conducting 
the maximum likelihood method using AMOS 18.0 were calculated.  First, the final model was 
run with no between-group constraints.  This model was used to test for equivalence across 
groups when additional cross-group constraints are imposed.  Then, a series of chi-square tests 
were conducted comparing the unconstrained model to subsequent models with increasing 
numbers of constraints.  The constraints were applied in the following order: measurement 
weights, measurement intercepts, structural weights, structural covariances, structural residuals, 
and measurement residuals.  If the chi-square change between the unconstrained model and the 
final model with all cross-group constraints imposed is not statistically significant, then 
equivalence between groups is supported.  According to Byrne (2001), invariance between 
groups means that the groups should be analyzed together.  For each model, we first report 
results from the multigroup analyses.  Second, we report parameter estimates for the both groups 
from the unconstrained model as well as the paths which are significantly different between both 
groups in the unconstrained model. 
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Third, in order to test the hypothesized multiple mediators in each model, we followed 
the approach of Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) and calculated 95% bootstrapping confidence 
intervals (CI) using the bias-corrected percentile method.  Finally, to evaluate the importance of 
each individual element of the cognitive triad as mediators, the contribution for each individual 
mediator was tested with the product method using PRODCLIN (MacKinnon, Fritz, Williams, & 
Lockwood, 2007) for the significant multiple mediators.  A statistically significant individual 
mediation effect exists when the confidence limits do not contain zero. 
Results 
Descriptive data, internal consistency, and correlations for all instruments at all three 
waves are presented in Table 1.  All measures are correlated with each other.  Nevertheless, z-
tests comparing correlations between the three CTI subscales at wave 1 reveal that the 
correlation between the negative self and negative world subscales are significantly higher than 
the correlation between the negative future and negative world subscales (z = 3.21; p = .001) and 
are marginally higher than the correlation between the negative self and negative world subscales 
(z = 1.38; p = .084).  The correlation between the negative self and negative future subscales are 
significantly higher than the correlation between the future and world subscales (z = 1.82; p = 
.034). 
Identificantion of the best Model (Using the Total Sample).  To identify the model 
that fits the data best, different models each allowing for direct associations of the parts of the 
inference styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3 (partial mediation models) were 
tested and compared with identical models that do not allow for these direct associations (full 
mediation models) (Table 2).  These models are (a) the original hopelessness model with only 
negative view of the future at wave 2 mediating the associations between all inference styles at 
COGNITIVE TRIAD AS MEDIATOR 14 
wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3, (b) the prosposed model, and (c) a model with all 
three elements of the cognitive triad at wave 2 mediating the associations between all inference 
styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3.  Comparing the partial and full mediation 
models reveals that each partial mediation model fits the data better than the corresponding mode 
with full mediation.  Furthermore, the direct associations of the parts of the inference styles at 
wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3 contribute equally to the improvement of the model, 
independent of the other associations in the model (Table 2).  Next, the proposed model was 
compared with the original hopelessness model, revealing that the proposed model fits the data 
significantly better than the original hopelessness model  (Δ² (2, N = 398) = 10.25, p = .01).  
Finally, the proposed model was compared with the model in that all three elements of the 
cognitive triad mediate the associations between all inference styles and depressive symptoms  
(Δ² (6, N = 398) = 18.00, p = .01).  The latter model fits the data better than the proposed 
model.  The standardized parameter estimates of these partial mediation models are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4. 
Multigroup Analyses.  Multigroup analyses comparing women (n = 319) and men (n = 
78) indicate a partial mediation model in that all three elements of the cognitive triad at wave 2 
mediate the associations between all inference styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 
3 are not stable across both sexes (²unconstrained (22) = 16.36, p = .798, χ
2/df = 0.74, CFI (1.00), 
RMSEA (<0.01), AIC (388.36); ²fully constrained (115) = 141.84, p = .045, χ
2/df = 1.23, CFI (0.99), 
RMSEA (0.02), AIC (327.84); Δ²(93) = 125.48, p = .014).  However, only 2 of 33 paths across 
different waves are significantly different between the female and the male subsample.  The 
regression weights for the paths between negative inferences about consequences of a negative 
event at wave 1 and the negative view of the world at wave 2 and the path between the negative 
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view of the future at wave 1 and the negative view of the self at wave 2 are significiantly higher 
in men than in women. In addition, both paths are significant in the male subsample but not in 
the female subsample (Tables 3 and 4). 
Multigroup analyses comparing clinically depressed (n = 90) and nonclinically depressed 
individuals (n = 308) supports the partial mediation model in that all three elements of the 
cognitive triad at wave 2 mediate the associations between all inference styles at wave 1 and 
depressive symptoms at wave 3 are not stable across these groups (²unconstrained (22) = 27.12, p = 
.207, χ2/df = 1.23, CFI (1.00), RMSEA (0.02), AIC (399.12); ²fully constrained (115) = 557.96, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 4.85, CFI (0.77), RMSEA (0.10), AIC (743.96); Δ²(93) = 530.84, p < .001.  
Nevertheless, only 1 of 33 paths across different waves is significantly different between the 
clinically depressed and the nonclinically depressed subsample.  The regression weight for the 
path between negative inferences about characteristics of the self at wave 1 and depressive 
symptoms at wave 2 is significiantly higher in clinically depressed compared to nonclinically 
depressed individuals. In addition, this path is significant only in the clinically depressed 
subsample but not in the nonclinically depressed subsample (Tables 3 and 4). 
Tests for Mediation.  In order to test for multiple mediation effects, 95% bootstrapping 
confidence intervals (CI) using the bias-corrected percentile method were calculated for the total 
sample and for each subsample (women, men, nonclinically depressed, clinically depressed) 
separated.  The results of these analyses reveal that for both the total sample and for the female 
subsample, the elements of the cognitive triad at wave 2 significantly mediate the association of 
negative inferences about consequences of a negative event at wave 1 depressive symptoms at 
wave 3 (Table 5).  Further, the cognitive triad marginally mediates the association of inferences 
about consequences of a negative event with depressive symptoms in the total sample and the 
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female subsample.  The cognitive triad does not mediate any other association between inference 
styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3 (Table 5). 
Finally, to estimate the importance of the negative view of the self and the world as 
mediators in the hopelessness model, the individual contribution of each element of the cognitive 
triad while controlling for all other possible direct and indirect effects was tested for the 
significant or marginally significant multiple mediation effects.  The results of this last step of 
the analyses revealed no significant effect of any individual mediator (Table 6). 
Discussion 
Following Abramson et al. (1978, 1989) and Beck et al. (1979), it was proposed that the 
effect of each part of the inference style is partially mediated by a negative view of the future, 
and that the effect of negative inferences about stability and about the characteristics of the self is 
in addition partially mediated by the negative view of the self.  Furthermore, it was predicted that 
all parts of the inference style continue to show direct effects on depressive symptoms eight 
weeks later.  Regarding possible differences in the associations between inference style, 
cognitive triad, and depressive symptoms, no sex differences or differences between clinically 
depressed and nonclinically depressed individuals were expected.  
The study reveals several important findings with regard to these hypotheses:  First, a 
partial mediation model with all three elements of the cognitive triad at wave 2 being associated 
with all inference styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3 but not with depressive 
symptoms at wave 1 fits the data better than any other tested model.  Second, the details of this 
model are not stable across different subsamples (women vs. men, nonclinical vs. clinical).  
Third, no individual element of the cognitive triad at wave 2 mediated the associations between 
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inference styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3 while controlling for all other 
possible mediation effects within the model. 
Inspecting the significant and marginally significant paths within the partial mediation 
model in that all three elements of the cognitive triad at wave 2 are associated with all inference 
styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3 in the total sample reveals some expected 
and some unexpected results.  As predicted (Abramson et al., 1978, 1989), the negative view of 
the future is associated with most parts of the inference style 4 weeks earlier.  Unexpectedly, the 
inference about the stability of the cause of a negative event does not affect the negative view of 
the future.  The inference about characteristics of the self is associated with the negative view of 
the self as expected (Abramson et al., 1989), but inferences about the stability of the cause of a 
negative event does not affect the negative view of the self. Instead, inferences about the stability 
of the cause, about consequences of a negative event, and about characteristics of the self affect 
the negative view of the world.  Finally, contrary to the expectations, depressive symptoms do 
not affect elements of the cognitive triad at an earlier wave. 
The most surprising result is probably the failture to find a significant association 
between the inference about the stability of the cause of a negative event with the negative view 
of the future four weeks later.  Nevertheless, only one study tested for associations between these 
two constructs.  Most studies researching the associations between inference styles and the 
negative view of the future integrate the inferences about stability and globality of causes into 
one score (Alloy & Clements, 1998; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992).  The only exception testing for 
association between the inference about the stability of the cause of a negative event with the 
negative view of the future did not find a significant relation in patients with rheumatoid arthritis 
(McEvoy DeVellis & Blalock, 1992).   While the lack of a significant association between the 
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inference about the stability of the cause of a negative event with the negative view of the future 
might seem conceptually difficult, it is not inconsistent with the hopelessness model.  Abramson 
et al. (1989) propose that many factors, none of which is necessary or sufficient, may lead to a 
negative view of the future.  In addition, Abramson et al (1978) propose that individuals that 
make stable or global inferences will expect their own future to be negative.  Thus, it is possible 
that significant associations in previous studies are driven by inferences about the globality of the 
causes of negative events.  Further research separating inferences about stability and globality of 
causes of negative events is necessary to test this hypothesis. 
One possible explanation for the unexpected associations between the negative view of 
the world with inferences about the stability of the cause and negative consequences of an event 
in the male subsample might be the stability of consequences of events and the world as 
anticipated by the individual.  Particularly for depressed individuals, characteristics of the world 
rarely seem to change (Townsend Carlson, 2001).  In addition, 8 of 10 items of the CTI world 
subscale describe trait-like issues (e.g., “The world is a very hostile place.”).  Thus, it can be 
concluded that an individual makes more stable inferences and inferences about consequences of 
an event when the event was expected to be caused by outside factors (negative view of the 
world).  To test the hypothesis it is necessary to include the anticipated main causes of a 
particular event in future research. 
A close inspection of the CTI world subscale might also provide an explanation for the 
association between inferences about negative characteristics of the self with a negative view of 
the world.  Of the 10 items in the CTI world subscale 3 items focused on internal issues of the 
individual (e.g., “I am faced with many difficulties.”).  In addition, 4 items described behaviors 
of other people who are connected with the individual in some manner (e.g., “My family doesn’t 
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care what happens to me.”).  It can not be excluded that the participants interpreted these items in 
a way that the described issues in these items are their own fault.  For example, it is possible that 
the participants believe they are to blame when their family do not seem to be interested in their 
fate.  This is consistent with the depressive bias to attribute the responsibility for negative events 
to oneself as described by both cognitive theories studied in this research (Abramson et al., 1989; 
Beck, 1976, 1979).  Based on this hypothesis, higher correlations between the CTI self and world 
subscales than between these subscales and the future subscale are to be expected.  Analyses 
finding the expected differences between the correlations provided evidence for the hypothesis 
that the association between inferences about negative characteristics of the self and the negative 
view of the world are likely to be caused by psychometric problems with the CTI items.  As 
there is currently no other instrument to measure the cognitive triad, more research which 
focuses on the psychometric properties of the CTI items or the development of a new instrument 
to measure the cognitive triad is needed. 
Before exploring the differences in the model between women and men as well as 
between nonclinical and clinical depressed subsamples, it should be pointed out that the present 
study was not designed for these subanalyses.  Thus, the male and the clinical subsample are 
both only about 20% of the total sample.  Therefore, all differences might be an artifact of 
having low power to study the details of the final model in these subsamples.  Having said this, 
an inspection of the differences between women and men revealed that only 2 of 33 paths 
between different waves are significantly different between both sexes.  However, six of seven 
significant or marginally significant associations between parts of the inference style and the 
cognitive triad four weeks later are solely based on the female subsample.  While the sex 
differences are not consistent with Beck’s cognitive theory ( Beck, 1976; 1996) and the 
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hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989), these results are consistent with previous empirical 
publications (Goldstein, 2006; Stone et al., 2010).  Both studies found consistent associations 
between inference styles and depressive symptoms in female samples but not in male samples.  
In addition, the interaction between inferences and life events was not significantly associated 
with depressive symptoms in women in both studies but in men in Stone’s (2010) study.  Thus, 
our results and previous empirical studies demonstrate that the cognitive models are consistent 
with a vulnerability model in women, but more in line with a vulnerability-stress model in men.  
Considering the limitations of this study with regard to sex specific analyses and the very limited 
number of studies researching for possible sex differences in the associations between cognitive 
variables and depressive symptoms, future research is needed to replicate and interpret these 
findings.  
An inspection of the differences between clinically and nonclinically depressed 
participants revealed that only 1 of 33 associations between different waves are significantly 
different between both groups.  Nevertheless, three of four significant associations between parts 
of the inference style at wave 1 and the cognitive triad at wave 2 is solely based on the 
subsample that is not clinically depressed. Besides the already mentioned small sample size for 
this clinical subsample, this difference might be explainable by changes in the relations between 
inference styles and cognitive triad for the development and maintenance of depressive 
symptoms.  For example, Abramson et al. (1989) propose that negative inference styles need to 
be activated by negative events to cause a negative view of the future and depressive symptoms 
(development phase).  However, after the activation of negative negative styles, no further 
negative events are necessary to maintain a negative view of the future.   In addition, consistent 
with Kwon and Oei (1994), two experimental studies with nonclinically (development) and 
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clinically depressed (maintenance) individuals demonstrated that schemata influenced automatic 
thoughts but not the other way around in nonclinically depressed individuals. In clinically 
depressed individuals, however, schemata and automatic thoughts influenced each other (Pössel 
& Knopf, 2008).  Thus, the differences in the associations between inference styles and cognitive 
triad between the clinically and nonclinically depressive sample might be caused by real 
differences in cognitive processing.  Nevertheless, until the findings are replicated with bigger 
sample sizes the differences between the subsamples with clinically depressed and nonclinically 
depressed participants should be interpreted cautiously. 
The next major finding is the failure to establish the elements of the cognitive triad as 
mediators between inference styles and depressive symptoms.  This result is especially surprising 
as we could not even establish the negative view of future as mediator between inferences and 
depressive symptoms, one of the central elements of the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 
1989).  While contrary to the hopelessness model and some empirical studies (e.g., Alloy & 
Clements, 1998), this finding is consistent with other studies (Kapçi & Cramer, 2000; McEvoy 
DeVellis & Blalock, 1992) that did not find the negative view of the future  to mediate the 
relations between inference styles and depressive symptoms. Moreover, it is partially consistent 
with a third group of studies in that the negative view of the future mediated these associations 
only partially (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992) or for one sex (Goldstein, 2006; Stone et al., 2010).  In 
addition, it should be considered that all variables measured at one wave are correlated and that 
we simultaneously tested for mediation effects of all three elements of the cognitive triad.  Thus, 
not only is it possible that the elements of the cognitive triad mediate the association between 
inference styles and depressive symptoms in ways we did not test for (e.g., inference style at 
wave 1 to cognitive triad at wave 1 to cognitive triad at wave 2 to depressive symptoms at wave 
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2/wave 3) but it is also likely that the variance explained by the three elements of the cognitive 
triad overlaps. Both issues make the mediation tests in the present study very conservative and 
cause an underestimation of the mediation effect. 
In addition, a methodological factor that should be considered as possible explanation for 
the lack of mediation effects becomes obvious in the fact that the significant paths between the 
elements of the cognitive triad and depressive symptoms from wave 1 to wave 2 are different 
from the significant associations of the same constructs from wave 2 to wave 3.  Both results 
might be evidence for nonlinear relations (Cole & Maxwell, 2003) that can be caused by a 
violation of the stationarity assumption.  Kenny (1979) noted that stationarity “refers to an 
unchanging causal structure” (p. 232).  Applied to the current study, the stationarity assumption 
implies, for example, that the degree to which the negative view of the self produces changes in 
depressive symptoms remains the same over time.  In other words, it is possible that the 
differences in significant regressions from wave 1 to wave 2 compared to differences from wave 
2 to wave 3 might refer to an acceleration or deceleration of causal relations between the studied 
constructs.  Another explanation for the differences in significant regressions between the waves 
is that the optimal time lag may vary from one part of the model (e.g., inferences style to 
cognitive triad) to another part of the same model (e.g., cognitive triad to depressive symptoms) 
or between subsamples.  Finally, the selected time lag between waves may not be optimal to 
represent the full causal effect of one variable on another (Cole & Maxwell, 2003).  
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the fit of the partial mediation model is good.  Thus, if a 
violation of the stationarity assumption caused the previously described problems, this violation 
seems to have limited impact on the model fit.   
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Considering the optimal lengths of the time lag, there is no previous longitudinal study to 
integrate all elements of the cognitive triad into the hopelessness model, but other longitudinal 
studies researching the associations between inference style, negative view of the future 
(hopelessness) and depressive symptoms with adult samples used time lags of five days to two 
months (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Stone et al., 2010).  Further, longitudinal studies evaluating 
the causal relationships between the constructs in Beck’s cognitive theory (Beck, 1976, 1996) 
used time lags between four weeks and six months (Kwon & Oei, 1992; Oei & Kwon, 2007; 
Pössel, 2010a).  Thus, with a time lag of four weeks, the current study is well within the range 
established by previous studies.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the most of the cited 
longitudinal studies were limited to 2-waves (Kwon & Oei, 1992; Oei & Kwon, 2007; Metalsky 
& Joiner, 1992; Stone et al., 2010); they were thus not able to detect if causal relations even 
within Beck’s cognitive model or the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) accelerate or 
decelerate.  Thus, future research is needed that uses at least four waves to estimate the optimal 
time lag between measurements and to test the stationarity assumption.  As the time lag between 
two weeks and six months seems sufficient to successfully measure the effects of most variables 
included in Beck’s cognitive model or the hopelessness model and it is not feasible to measure 
all variables more often than every two weeks, it can be suggested to measure the constructs of 
both models every two weeks for six months, if possible. 
Summarized, although the results seem contrary to the idea to integrate all three elements 
of the cognitive triad into the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989), a closer inspection of 
the results supports such an integration.  First, it is important to point out that there were hardly 
any significant effects of the cognitive triad at wave 2 on depressive symptoms on wave 3.  Thus, 
significant mediation effects of the negative view of the self and the world can barely be 
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expected.  In addition, that the model with all parts of the inference style affecting all three 
elements of the cognitive triad fits the data better than the model in that the negative view of the 
future is the only element of the cognitive element provides some support for the importance of 
the integration of the cognitive triad into the hopelessness model.  Finally, significant or 
marginally significant associations between any part of the inference style at wave 1 and the 
negative view of the future at wave 2 were found three times in the total sample and four times 
across the subsamples.  However, associations with the negative view of the self were found 
once in the total sample and twice across the subsamples.  Associations with the negative view of 
the world were found even twice in the total sample and six times across the subsamples. These 
results emphasis especially the importance of the negative view of the world for the hopelessness 
model. 
Some limitations of the present study need to be addressed.  The sole utilization of self-
report instruments can be seen as a limitation of the present research.  The use of multiple 
methods (e.g. self-report questionnaires, interview data to measure depressive symptoms, and 
information processing paradigms) to assess the cognitive constructs and depression would be 
beneficial for future studies.  Problematicaly, information processing paradigms for inference 
style and for the cognitive triad have yet to be developed.  As self-report instruments already 
exist for all measured constructs, the restriction to their utilization was deemed adequate at this 
time.  Another limitation is the restriction resulting from the utilisation of an university sample 
with the majority of participants being female.  The homogeneity of the sample concerning sex, 
educational level, age range, and social environment may limit the generalizability of the results 
to general and clinical populations.  Connected with this limitation is the small number of male 
participants and participants with depressive symptoms in the clinical range.  This limitation is 
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not only a threat to the generability of the results but also to the reliability of the results in these 
subsamples.  Thus, replication studies with large clinical samples and higher numbers of male 
participants are desirable. 
On the other hand, methodological advantages of the research enhance confidence in the 
findings:  A relatively large total sample combined with a 3-wave longitudinal design allowed to 
test the mediational effect of the cognitive triad.  In addition, data analytic methods best suited to 
test multiple mediators in multiple wave longitudinal designs in general and mediation effects in 
particular have been utilized (Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
The results are not only important from an academic point of view, but also for clinical 
applications, as the presented research can be seen as a first step to develop a model integrating 
the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) and Beck’s cognitive theory (Beck, 1976, 1996).  
Such an integrated cognitive model might allow us to better understand how concepts from 
various cognitive models interact and how different techniques influence cognitive variables.  
Beyond the advancement in theory, an integrative model might lead to improvement in the 
effectiveness of psychotherapies for depression by a theory-driven integration of therapeutic 
techniques that are based on the different cognitive models. 
Summarizing, the presented 3-wave longitudinal study demonstrates that all three 
elements of the cognitive triad (Beck, 1976, 1996) should be included in the hopelessness model 
(Abramson et al., 1989).  Nevertheless, tested individually none of the elements of the cognitive 
triad proved to mediate the relations between inference styles and depressive symptoms.  Besides 
methodological issues, the rigorosity of controlling for all other direct and indirect effects might 
explain this result. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Data and Correlations Between All Instruments at all three waves 
 CES-Dt1 CES-Dt3 CSQgt1 CSQst1 CSQcot1 CSQset1 CTIst1 CTIwt1 CTIft1 CTIst2 CTIwt2 CTIft2 
CES-Dt1 .90            
CES-Dt3 .38 .91           
CSQgt1 .32 .31 .82          
CSQst1 .18 .19 .64 .83         
CSQcot1 .32 .34 .76 .52 .90        
CSQset1 .37 .38 .60 .43 .65 .91       
CTIst1 -.55 -.44 -.47 -.35 -.45 -.52 .82      
CTIwt1 -.50 -.33 -.36 -.24 -.38 -.31 .58 .66     
CTIft1 -.52 -.36 -.29 -.21 -.33 -.33 .50 .38 .48    
CTIst2 -.48 -.45 -.42 -.31 -.45 -.50 .77 .51 .42 .83   
CTIwt2 -.41 -.38 -.33 -.24 -.38 -.36 .48 .70 .38 .60 .65  
CTIft2 -.42 -.44 -.30 -.22 -.36 -.37 .45 .29 .66 .56 .47 .46 
Mean 15.59 16.51 37.38 41.20 31.16 29.61 33.32 25.33 26.21 33.86 25.63 26.22 
SD 10.01 10.15 10.34 10.41 11.35 13.24 6.14 4.77 3.80 5.95 4.62 3.69 
Note. N = 302 for all variables. Values in the diagonal represent Cronbach’s Alpha. CES-D = CES-D witout 4 items overlapping with 
the CTI; CSQg = CSQ, negative events general-specific; CSQs = CSQ, stable-unstable; CSQco = CSQ, negative inference about 
consequences; CSQse = CSQ, negative inference about the self; CTIs = CTI, negative view of the self; CTIw = CTI, negative view of 
the world; CTIf = CTI, negative view of the future; t1 = assessment at beginning of the semester; t2 = assessment at middle of the 
semester; t3 = assessment at end of the semester. All correlations are significant at p < .05. 
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Table 2 
Indices of Goodness of Fit and Parsimony of the Tested Models as well as Results of the ²-Tests Comparing Full and Partial Models 
(N = 398) 
Models df ² p-value ²/df CFI RMSEA AIC Δdf Δ² p-value 
Original hopelessness model – full mediation 23 48.81 0.001 2.12 0.99 0.05 210.81    
Original hopelessness model – partial 
mediation 
19 36.24 0.01 1.91 0.99 0.05 206.24 4 12.57 0.05 
Proposed model – full mediation 21 38.56 0.011 1.84 0.99 0.05 204.56    
Proposed model – partial mediation 17 25.98 0.075 1.53 0.99 0.04 199.98 4 12.57 0.05 
All associations mediated – full mediation 15 20.55 0.152 1.37 0.99 0.03 198.55    
All associations mediated – partial mediation 11 7.98 0.715 0.73 1.00 < .01 193.98 4 12.57 0.05 
Note. Original hopelessness model = hopelessness model with only negative view of the future mediating the associations between 
inference styles and depressive symptoms; bidirectional model = hopelessness model but in addition with depressive symptoms at 
wave 1 effecting all elements of the cognitive triad at wave 2; all associations mediated = model with all three elements of the 
cognitive triad at wave 2 mediating the associations between all inference styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at wave 3; full 
mediation = a model not allowing for direct associations of the parts of the inference styles at wave 1 and depressive symptoms at 
wave 3; partial mediation = a model allowing for direct associations of the parts of the inference styles at wave 1 and depressive 
symptoms at wave 3.
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Table 3 
Regression Weights for associations between Waves and Z-Scores for Comparisons Between 
Subsamples. 
 
all female male z-score 
nonclinically 
depressed 
clinically 
depressed 
z-score 
CSQgt1- CTIst2 -.02 .02 -.18 -1.48 -.01 .02 0.22 
CSQgt1- CTIwt2 .08 .13+ -.17 1.87 .09 .12 0.20 
CSQgt1- CTIft2 .12+ .10 .13 0.18 .11 .12 0.25 
CSQgt1- CES-Dt3 -.02 .00 .04 0.16 -.01 -.09 -0.44 
CSQst1- CTIst2 -.02 -.02 .02 0.44 .01 -.09 -0.91 
CSQst1- CTIwt2 -.10* -.10+ -.05 0.40 -.12* -.03 0.63 
CSQst1- CTIft2 -.05 -.07 .00 0.46 -.05 -.08 -0.41 
CSQst1- CES-Dt3 .00 -.02 -.03 -0.09 .00 .00 0.02 
CSQcot1- CTIst2 -.06 -.08 -.04 0.29 -.08 -.09 -0.31 
CSQcot1- CTIwt2 -.04 -.10 .26* 2.49* -.02 -.18 -1.00 
CSQcot1- CTIft2 -.12+ -.12+ -.09 0.09 -.09 -.14 -0.51 
CSQcot1- CES-Dt3 .07 .09 .03 -0.33 .10 -.02 -0.67 
CSQset1- CTIst2 -.11* -.13* -.02 0.88 -.13* -.02 0.78 
CSQset1- CTIwt2 -.12* -.13* -.17 -0.42 -.12* -.03 0.80 
CSQset1- CTIft2 -.12* -.10+ -.22+ -1.07 -.08 -.21* -1.34 
CSQset1- CES-Dt3 .16* .14* .06 -0.49 .06 .50*** 3.33** 
CTIst1- CTIst2 .63*** .65*** .52*** -1.08 .54*** .80*** 1.87 
CTIst1- CTIwt2 .01 .03 -.06 -0.61 -.03 .25+ 1.80 
CTIst1- CTIft2 .11+ .13+ .08 -0.27 .12+ .03 -0.82 
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CTIst1- CES-Dt2 -.17** -.16* -.20 -0.29 -.10 -.31* -0.99 
CTIwt1- CTIst2 .08* .04 .21* 1.61 .11* .01 -0.77 
CTIwt1- CTIwt2 .62*** .58*** .67*** 0.07 .62*** .46*** -1.60 
CTIwt1- CTIft2 -.02 .00 -.12 -0.89 -.02 .04 0.54 
CTIwt1- CES-Dt2 -.12* -.10 -.18 0.38 -.12+ -.12 -0.03 
CTIft1- CTIst2 .01 -.01 .17* 1.98* .04 -.08 -1.32 
CTIft1- CTIwt2 .12** .11* .13 0.12 .13** .03 -1.29 
CTIft1- CTIft2 .56*** .54*** .61*** 0.80 .48*** .62*** 0.68 
CTIft1- CES-Dt2 -.06 -.08 .05 0.97 -.02 -.15 -0.79 
CES-Dt1- CES-Dt2 .31*** .33*** .22+ -0.69 .30*** .17+ -1.51 
CTIst2- CES-Dt3 -.07 -.15+ .18 1.92 -.09 .01 0.83 
CTIwt2- CES-Dt3 -.03 -.04 -.09 -0.33 -.01 -.15 -1.09 
CTIft2- CES-Dt3 -.10 -.08 -.18 -0.58 -.08 -.01 0.61 
CES-Dt2- CES-Dt3 .37*** .31*** .59*** 1.85 .35*** .42*** 0.72 
Note. CSQg = CSQ, negative events general-specific; CSQs = CSQ, stable-unstable; CSQco = 
CSQ, negative inference about consequences; CSQse = CSQ, negative inference about the self; 
CTIs = CTI, negative view of the self; CTIw = CTI, negative view of the world; CTIf = CTI, 
negative view of the future; t1 = assessment at beginning of the semester; t2 = assessment at 
middle of the semester; t3 = assessment at end of the semester. + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; 
*** p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Correlations of all Variables at the same Wave.  
 all women men nonclinically 
depressed 
clinically 
depressed 
CES-Dt1 – CSQgt1 .31*** .33*** .25* .18** -.08 
CES-Dt1 – CSQst1 .17** .17** .19 .08 -.04 
CES-Dt1 – CSQcot1 .31*** .34*** .21+ .17** -.04 
CES-Dt1 – CSQset1 .35*** .35*** .37** .16** .10 
CES-Dt1 – CTIst1 -.50*** -.52*** -.44*** -.28*** -.25* 
CES-Dt1 – CTIwt1 -.48*** -.55*** -.29* -.33*** -.18 
CES-Dt1 – CTIft1 -.49*** -.49*** -.47*** -.24*** -.24* 
CSQgt1 – CSQst1 .64*** .64*** .67*** .60*** .72*** 
CSQgt1 – CSQcot1 .76*** .77*** .71*** .74*** .72*** 
CSQgt1 – CSQset1 .60*** .59*** .62*** .56*** .53*** 
CSQgt1 – CTIst1 -.48*** -.49*** -.39** -.42*** -.39*** 
CSQgt1 – CTIwt1 -.32*** -.33*** -.29* -.25*** -.11 
CSQgt1 – CTIft1 -.26*** -.32*** -.05 -.16** -.17 
CSQst1 – CSQcot1 .52*** .54*** .41*** .47*** .59*** 
CSQst1 – CSQset1 .43*** .43*** .43*** .37*** .50*** 
CSQst1 – CTIst1 -.32*** -.37*** -.25* -.29*** -.41*** 
CSQst1 – CTIwt1 -.19*** -.20*** -.18 -.15* -.10 
CSQst1 – CTIft1 -.17*** -.20*** -.05 -.09 -.20+ 
CSQcot1 – CSQset1 .65*** .64*** .69*** .62*** .57*** 
CSQcot1 – CTIst1 -.44*** -.48*** -.30* -.42*** -.28* 
CSQcot1 – CTIwt1 -.36*** -.40*** -.23+ -.32*** -.12 
CSQcot1 – CTIft1 -.32*** -.37*** -.11 -.16** -.35** 
CSQset1 – CTIst1 -.52*** -.56*** -.37** -.45*** -.46*** 
CSQset1 – CTIwt1 -.31*** -.33*** -.30* -.25*** -.04 
CSQset1 – CTIft1 -.32*** -.34*** -.21+ -.18** -.26* 
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CTIst1 – CTIwt1 .58*** .58*** .58*** .47*** .54*** 
CTIst1 – CTIft1 .50*** .52*** .41*** .32*** .48*** 
CTIft1 – CTIwt1 .38*** .41*** .24* .19*** .37** 
CES-Dt2er – CTIst2er -.30*** -.32*** -.24+ -.38*** -.04 
CES-Dt2er– CTIwt2er -.29*** -.27*** -.36** -.32*** -.15 
CES-Dt2er – CTIft2er -.36*** -.37*** -.36** -.37*** -.38** 
CTIst2er – CTIwt2er .40*** .40*** .33 .44*** .25* 
CTIst2er – CTIft2er .40*** .41*** .41 .40*** .44*** 
CTIwt2er – CTIft2er .31*** .33*** .25 .31*** .37** 
Note. CSQg = CSQ, negative events general-specific; CSQs = CSQ, stable-unstable; CSQco = 
CSQ, negative inference about consequences; CSQse = CSQ, negative inference about the self; 
CTIs = CTI, negative view of the self; CTIw = CTI, negative view of the world; CTIf = CTI, 
negative view of the future; t1 = assessment at beginning of the semester; t2 = assessment at 
middle of the semester; t3 = assessment at end of the semester; er = error term. + p < .10; * p < 
.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
  
COGNITIVE TRIAD AS MEDIATOR 37 
Table 5 
Confidence Intervals for Multiple Mediation Effects. 
  Lower  CI Upper CI 
All CSQgt1 – CES-Dt3 -.046 .007 
 CSQst1 – CES-Dt3 -.006 .035 
 CSQcot1 – CES-Dt3 .000 .043* 
 CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 .000 .037+ 
Women CSQgt1 – CES-Dt3 -.056 .007 
 CSQst1 – CES-Dt3 -.009 .044 
 CSQcot1 – CES-Dt3 .003 .059* 
 CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 -.001 .042+ 
Men CSQgt1 – CES-Dt3 -.201 .046 
 CSQst1 – CES-Dt3 -.080 .069 
 CSQcot1 – CES-Dt3 -.149 .079 
 CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 -.048 .150 
Nonclinically CSQgt1 – CES-Dt3 -.051 .010 
depressed CSQst1 – CES-Dt3 -.014 .032 
 CSQcot1 – CES-Dt3 -.004 .050 
 CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 -.005 .037 
Clinically CSQgt1 – CES-Dt3 -.172 .069 
depressed CSQst1 – CES-Dt3 -.064 .079 
 CSQcot1 – CES-Dt3 -.029 .151 
 CSQset1 – CES-Dt3 -.063 .065 
Note. CSQg = CSQ, negative events general-specific; CSQs = CSQ, stable-unstable; CSQco = 
CSQ, negative inference about consequences; CSQse = CSQ, negative inference about the self; 
CTIs = CTI, negative view of the self; CTIw = CTI, negative view of the world; CTIf = CTI, 
negative view of the future; t1 = assessment at beginning of the semester; t2 = assessment at 
middle of the semester; t3 = assessment at end of the semester. + p < .10; * p < .05. 
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Table 6 
Confidence Intervals for Individual Mediation Effects of Significant or Marginally Significant 
Multiple Mediation Effects while Controlling for all other Direct and Indirect Effects in the 
Model. 
  Lower  CI Upper CI 
All CSQcot1 – CTIst2 – CES-Dt3 -.004 .020 
 CSQcot1 – CTIft2 – CES-Dt3 -.001 .028 
 CSQcot1 – CTIwt2 – CES-Dt3 -.004 .008 
 CSQset1 – CTIst2 – CES-Dt3 -.002 .013 
 CSQset1 – CTIft2 – CES-Dt3 -.0009 .021 
 CSQset1 – CTIwt2 – CES-Dt3 -.006 .012 
Women CSQcot1 – CTIst2 – CES-Dt3 -.0003 .037 
 CSQcot1 – CTIft2 – CES-Dt3 -.003 .027 
 CSQcot1 – CTIwt2 – CES-Dt3 -.007 .016 
 CSQset1 – CTIst2 – CES-Dt3 -.001 .023 
 CSQset1 – CTIft2 – CES-Dt3 -.002 .018 
 CSQset1 – CTIwt2 – CES-Dt3 -.007 .014 
Note. CSQco = CSQ, negative inference about consequences; CSQse = CSQ, negative inference 
about the self; CTIs = CTI, negative view of the self; CTIw = CTI, negative view of the world; 
CTIf = CTI, negative view of the future; t1 = assessment at beginning of the semester; t2 = 
assessment at middle of the semester; t3 = assessment at end of the semester. 
